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INTRODUCTION

Just as the Canadian legal system owes much to its British connections, so too do the political and legal systems of Australia. Commencing less than two hundred years ago with the arrival of the first
shipload of criminals and their British military guards, the ties with
the United Kingdom are still very evident today.
Australia has a Federal system of government. At both the State
and the Federal level, the parliamentary system of government has
been adopted. The United States model of a separate executive headed
by a President was deliberately rejected. The Prime Minister in the
Federal Government and the Premiers in the States, together with
their Cabinet Ministers, are drawn from the ranks of the majority
party in the lower Houses of Parliament.
The Queen of England is also the Queen of Australia, represented
in Australia by the Governors and the Governor-General. It was only
last year that the Federal Parliament and the United Kingdom Parliament passed the Australia Acts, which finally abolished all appeals to
the Privy Council and declared that the United Kingdom could no

*Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia. LL.B. (Qld), LL.M.
(Monash).
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longer pass legislation having paramount force for the States of Australia.1
The Commonwealth of Australia has a written constitution enacted
as a schedule to a United Kingdom statute. 2 The Constitution's main
purpose is to establish the different branches of government and to
divide up the powers between the Commonwealth and the states.
Apart from section 116, which provides a limited guarantee of religious
freedom, 3 there is no Bill of Rights in the Australian Constitution;
Australia has nothing equivalent to the amendments of the United
States Constitution or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Nor do any of the State Constitutions include a Bill of Rights.
Australia had a brief flirtation in the 1970s and early 1980s with
the notion of a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. The draft
included a provision designed to guarantee procedural due process.
But the idea has been shelved and is unlikely ever to see the light of
day again. It was simply too controversial. There were strong disagreements over its content, even within the Labor Party. Nor could
agreement be reached when it was suggested that the Bill be declaratory only, with no right to litigate for alleged breaches. There are
probably a number of reasons for the general lack of interest, but
they include the general conservatism of Australians when it comes
to proposals to alter the Constitution; the fear that a Bill of Rights
would result in a flood of litigation in the Federal Courts; and the
belief that the common law provides, and would continue to provide,
adequate protections against the infringement of fundamental individual rights.
Of course there are problems with this last justification. Apart
from any dispute about the adequacy of the common law's vision of
what constitutes fundamental individual rights, the principle of parliamentary supremacy in Australia permits the legislature to override
any common law principle provided its intention is made sufficiently
clear. Indeed, this was one of the reasons why a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights was regarded by many to be so desirable in
the first place.
Since Australia has no written Bill of Rights, procedural due process in Australia primarily refers to the common law principles of

1. Australia Act 1986 §§ 1, 2, 11 (Commonwealth); Australia Act, 1986 §§ 1, 2, 11 (U.K.).
2.

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. ch. 12.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA CONST. § 116 provides: "The Commonwealth shall
not make any law for establishing any religion or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth."
3.
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natural justice and procedural fairness. Also of some significance are
the recent legislative reforms in the field of administrative law initiated
at the federal level. In Canada, the common law movement towards
a broad notion of procedural fairness in government administration
has been overtaken by a constitutional concept of fundamental justice:
the direction has changed. In Australia, this change of direction has
not occurred and is unlikely to.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS

Although Australia has been unwilling to provide procedural protections constitutionally, the federal legislature has been active in
promulgating a series of administrative law reforms designed to provide a comprehensive system for the review of federal administrative
decisions. The key enactments are the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, 4 the Ombudsman Act 1976, 5 the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977,6 and the Freedom of Information
7
Act 1982.
A.

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act was created to provide
an avenue for the independent review of a range of administrative
decisions made by federal government officers. The review is on the
merits. With only a few exceptions, the Tribunal is empowered to
exercise the powers conferred by statute on the original or primary
decisionmaker for the purpose of reaching the right or preferable
decision in the circumstances of each case. s The Tribunal was originally
envisaged as a general appellate tribunal that would hear appeals
against a broad range of federal administrative decisions. As it has
turned out, the Tribunal's jurisdiction over a particular area must be
specifically conferred by legislative enactment. 9 The list of subject
areas is growing, but it has become apparent that there are a large
number of administrative decisions that are unsuitable for review by
an independent, appointed tribunal. However, the list of reviewable
decisions does include all decisions under the Social Security Act 1947

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. (1975).
Ombudsman Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. (1976).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. (1977).
Freedom of Information Act, AUSTL. AcTs P. (1982).
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act § 43(1).
Id. §§ 25, 26.
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(Cth); e.g., decisions regarding unemployment benefits, age pensions,
sickness benefits, and family allowance. The Tribunal also has jurisdiction to review decisions by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs to deport non-citizens convicted of certain crimes. It has power
to hear tax appeals, appeals against certain decisions made under our
customs legislation, and air pilot license decisions.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal was established because judicial review of administrative action was thought to be too limited
in scope. A person dissatisfied with an administrative decision is not
just complaining that the decision is ultra vires or that it has been
reached without following a fair procedure. The real complaint is usually that the decision is wrong on the merits. It was therefore believed
that there needed to be an independent, expert appellate tribunal to
review the exercise of administrative powers on the merits.
The establishment of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal may
also be viewed as one response to the push toward procedural due
process or fairness in the administrative process. For even if the
legislature has not provided any hearing process at the original decisionmaking level, and even if the common law principles of natural
justice do not require oral hearings, if there is a right to appeal to
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, there is a right to the procedural
protections recognised and labeled as the rules of natural justice. It
should be pointed out, however, that the Tribunal is not legally obliged
to comply with the rules of evidence and is encouraged to pursue
hearing procedures that are more informal thai those associated with
judicial proceedings. 10
B.

The Ombudsman Act 1976

Many jurisdictions now have Ombudsman legislation, so the concept
is a familiar one. The Commonwealth Ombudsman is given the function
of investigating, either on his own motion or on receipt of a complaint,
"action that relates to a matter of administration."1 1 He may not investigate action taken by a Minister or by a judge. 12 The Ombudsman
has no coercive powers; recommendations are made to the department
involved, and if the department does not change its decision or otherwise rectify the situation, the Ombudsman may seek to place further

10. Id. § 33(1)(b).
11. Ombudsman Act § 5(1).
12. Id. § 5(2).
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pressure on the department by submitting an adverse report to the
Prime Minister and to Parliament.13
The grounds on which the Ombudsman may recommend that action
be taken are broad. They encompass the traditional grounds of judicial
review, but go on to include grounds such as "the action was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory"14 and "was in
all the circumstances wrong."15 Neither of these is recognized as a
ground of judicial review at common law in Australia. Although the
principles of "procedural due process" or "natural justice" are not
expressly mentioned in the Act, there is little doubt that the failure
to accord natural justice in a situation that requires it is a ground for
Ombudsman action.
C.

The Administrative Decisions (JudicialReview) Act 1977

The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act grew out of
increasing dissatisfaction with the limitations and technicalities surrounding the prerogative writs and with the procedures for judicial
review of administration action generally. In Australia, the writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are still in use, although in
recent years the declaration has become more popular - primarily
because it is not surrounded by so many technical limitations. The
Act was also designed to divert judicial review actions away from the
High Court to the newly created Federal Court of Australia. The
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act empowers the Federal
Court to review a "decision of an administrative character made.
(whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) under an enactment ....
A schedule contains a few exceptions.
Pre-existing statutory provisions ousting judicial review (i.e.,
privative clauses) are expressly overriden.17 An applicant seeks a simple order to review, and it is for the court to determine the appropriate
type of remedy, for example, whether the decision should be quashed
or whether the original decisionmaker should be required to go back
and comply with certain procedures.18 The grounds of review codify
the existing common law grounds and in some areas create new

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
(gives

Id. §§ 16, 17.
Id. § 15(1)(a)(ii).
Id. § 15(1)(a)(v).
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act § 3(1).
Id. § 4.
Id. §§ 3(1) (defines "order of review"), 5(1) (gives grounds for applying for review), 16
types of orders court can impose).
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grounds of review. For example, under the Act, any error of law may
be reviewed.19 At common law, distinctions are drawn between jurisdictional errors, which are reviewable, and non-jurisdictional errors,
which are not reviewable unless the error appears on the face of the
record of the proceedings - a requirement that presents difficulties
because at common law many administrative decisions do not require
the generation of any type of record, including the reasons for the
decision. The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act requires
the decisionmaker, upon request, to supply the affected person with
a "statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions
of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those
findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision. ' ' 20
In relation to the requirements of procedural due process, the Act
changes nothing. The relevant ground for review simply states: "A
person who is aggrieved by a decision to which this Act applies...
may apply to the Court for an order of review in respect of the decision
[on the ground that] a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred
in connexion with the making of the decision. ' 21 A number of decisions
interpreting the scope of the Act have held that this ground does not
create a right to require compliance with the rules of natural justice
if no right would be implied at common law. The ground is simply a
codification of the common law.Y
D. Freedom of Information Act 1982
In 1982, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted legislation modeled
on the United States freedom of information legislation. The Freedom
of Information Act is designed to facilitate access to information in
the possession of the government of the Commonwealth by maling
available to the public information about the operations and rules of
departments and by creating a general right of access to documents
in the possession of Ministers, departments, and public authorities.2
The Act also establishes a scheme for the amendment of personal
records. The Act attempts to reverse the common law position that
has traditionally protected the confidentiality of departmental records
and the anonymous character of administrative decisionmaldng.

19. Id. § 5(1)(f).
20. Id. § 13(1).
21. Id. § 5(1)(a).
22. See, e.g., Rioa v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, 62 A.L.R. 321, 333 (1985);
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Haj-Ismail, 40 A.L.R. 341, 347 (1982).
23. Freedom of Information Act § 3(1).
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III. AUSTRALIAN COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
OF NATURAL JUSTICE

When it comes to procedural due process requirements at the level
of the initial administrative decision or action, there are many instances
in which the procedure to be adopted is prescribed by the enabling
or organic statute. However, there is no legislative equivalent to the
United States Administrative Procedure Act? establishing uniform
minimum procedural standards in administration. In the absence of
any legislative provision setting out the procedure to be followed by
the decisionmaker, the issue is left to be resolved by the application
of the common law principles of natural justice.
Professor Macdonald indicated that, commencing with cases like
Re Nicholson & Haldimand-NorfolkRegional Board of Commissioners of Police' 5 in 1978, the Canadian Supreme Court was heading in
the direction of creating a new standard of procedural due process,
embodied in the notion of "fairness." This common law development
was hailed by many as a judicial breakthrough because it enabled the
courts to abandon a number of limitations inherent in the concept of
natural justice. In particular, it would no longer be necessary to characterise a power as judicial or quasi-judicial to attract the duty to comply
with a fair procedure, and the content of the duty could be tailored
to the individual circumstances. Australian common law has also moved
in this direction, and I will briefly outline some of its main features.
From the early 1970s, Australian courts have slowly moved away
from the traditional requirement that in order to attract a duty to
comply with certain procedures (the rules of natural justice) the power
must be characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial. This movement
began in England with cases like Ridge v. Baldwin2 6 that re-interpreted the old natural justice precedents. It has been facilitated by
the increased use of the declaratory order, which does not have some
of the limitations of the writ of certiorari. Perhaps the Administrative
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act with its all-purpose order to review
has also helped, although there have also been parallel developments
in the States. At the same time, the courts have freed up the types
of interests that they consider deserve procedural protection. No
longer must a person have a legal right; it is sufficient that a person

24. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
25. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (1978).
26. 1964 A.C. 40.
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has a "right, interest or legitimate expectation" of which it would be
27
unfair to deprive him or her without being heard.
These developments have opened up a whole range of administrative powers and discretions that are now required to be exercised in
conformity with procedures that are fair. These include social security
decisions and licensing decisions, which were traditionally regarded
as involving the conferral of privileges rather than legal rights, and
were therefore not required to be exercised according to the principles
of natural justice. The Minister's power to deport prohibited non-citizens (immigrants)2 now, in many cases, attracts a duty to comply
with notions of procedural fairness.
Although the courts still use much of the traditional language, and
tend to see the developments I have mentioned as but an extension
of the well-recognized common law natural justice principles, there is
a change in orientation. This change is reflected in the way in which
the principles are discussed. For example, in the 1985 High Court
decision of Kioa v. Ministerfor Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, 29 Justice Mason, in discussing what the rules of natural justice required in
relation to the deportation power, said:
It has been said on many occasions that natural justice and
fairness are to be equated ....
And it has been recognized
that in the context of administrative decision-making it is
more appropriate to speak of a duty to act fairly or to accord
procedural fairness. This is because the expression "natural
justice" has been associated, perhaps too closely associated,
with procedures followed by courts of law ....
The law has now developed to a point where it may be
accepted that there is a common law duty to act fairly, in
the sense of according procedural fairness, in the making of
administrative decisions which affect rights, interests and
legitimate expectations, subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary intention 0
Canadian academics, including Professor Macdonald, have drawn
attention to the formalistic content of the traditional rules of natural

27. See, e.g., Kioa v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, 62 A.L.R. 321 (1985);
Heatley v. Tasmanian Racing & Gaming Comm'n, 137 C.L.R. 487 (1977); Forbes v. New S.
Wales Trotting Club Ltd., 53 A.L.J.R. 536 (1979); Salemi v. Mackellar (No. 2), 137 C.L.R. 396
(1977).
28. See Migration Act, AUSTL. C. ACTS § 18 (1958).
29. 62 A.L.R. 321 (1985).
30. Id. at 346.
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justice. The new concept of procedural fairness is viewed as a way of
achieving greater flexibility: of enabling the courts to free themselves
from the rigid checklist of natural justice requirements associated with
judicial-style procedures (for example, the oral hearing, the right to
legal representation, and the right to cross-examine witnesses). In
Australia, the principles of natural justice have always been viewed
as variable in content, 31 but with the development of the broader
notion of procedural fairness and its application to a wide range of
administrative decisions, this feature of natural justice is becoming of
increasing significance.
In Kioa's case, Justice Mason pointed out that the early natural
justice cases focused attention on those elements in the making of
administrative decisions that were analogous to judicial determinations. This emphasis diverted attention away "from the need to insist
on the adoption in the administrative process of fair and flexible procedures for decisionmaking; procedures which did not necessarily take
curial procedures as their model."3' He suggested that the expression
"procedural fairness"
[miore aptly conveys the notion of a flexible obligation to
adopt fair procedures which are appropriate and adapted to
the circumstances of the particular case. The statutory power
must be exercised fairly, that is, in accordance with procedures that are fair to the individual considered in the light
of the statutory requirements, the interests of the individual
and the interests and purposes, whether public or private,
which the statute seeks to advance or protect or permits to
be taken into account as legitimate considerations.
Or, in other words, what fairness requires in a given case depends
on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules
under which the body is acting (if any), the subject matter that is
being dealt with, and so on. In practise this means that in many
situations an individual may not be able to insist on an oral hearing,
or on a right to confront and question witnesses. 4 The duty of fairness
may be satisfied by informing an affected person of the contents of
relevant reports or by providing a summary of information intended

31.
32.
33.
34.

See, e.g., University of Ceylon v. Fernando, [1960] 1 All E.R. 631, 637.
62 A.L.R. at 346.
Id. at 347.
See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Miller, 58 A.L.R. 269, 276 (1985).
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to be taken into account, coupled with an opportunity to make written
submissions before a final decision is reached."
It is probably the continued belief that the concept of procedural
fairness is but an aspect of the principles of natural justice that has
inhibited the courts from exploring its broader implications. For example, the courts are still very reluctant to apply principles of procedural
fairness to administrative decisions involving large elements of policy. 3c
Recently the High Court rejected the argument that a duty of fairness
required a decisionmaker to supply the reasons for a decision once
the decision had been made. Such a requirement, it was pointed out,
had never been a part of the traditional principles of natural justice7
Nor has there been any attempt to apply the concept to the exercise
of legislative power. Although there are Australian statutes that set
out uniform procedures for the making of some forms of delegated
legislation,3 such legislation does not provide any opportunity for interested people to comment on proposed regulations. With only one
exception, Australia has no legislative or common law equivalent to
the notice and comment requirements or the formal rule making procedures found in the United States Administrative Procedure Act. 39
Australian courts also appear to be having some difficulty determining the source of the power to impose requirements of procedural
fairness. Is the doctrine an example of the common law supplying the
omissions of Parliament, or are the courts merely expressing the implied intention of Parliament; i.e., engaging in an exercise of statutory
interpretation? This is a matter of semantics perhaps, but the practical
implications can be considerable. For example, if a particular statute
has addressed the issue of the procedure to be followed in the exercise
of a particular power, but the procedure is inadequate when judged
by common law standards, will the court impose additional requirements, or will it take the view that it is powerless to act? At the
moment, the courts are tending to take the conservative view that
they cannot step in and impose additional requirements because the
legislature has made its intention clear. 40 A number of High Court

See, e.g., Willarra Pty. Ltd. v. McVeigh, 54 A.L.R. 65 (1984).
Id.
Public Serv. Bd. of N.S.W. v. Osmond, 63 A.L.R. 559, 560 (1986).
38. See, e.g., Acts Interpretation Act, AUSTL. C. ACTS § 48 (1901).
39. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). But see Subordinate Legislation
(Review and Revocation) Act 1984 § 12, 1984 Vict. Acts 1879 (amending Subordinate Legislation
Act 1962) (recent legislation in the state of Victoria providing for notice and comment).
40. See, e.g., Kioa, 62 A.L.R. at 365-67 (Brennan, J.); Salemi v. Mackellar (No. 2), 137
C.L.R. 396, 400-02 (1977).
35.
36.
37.
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judges, including Justice Brennan in Kioa's case, are suggesting that
the principles of natural justice are simply a technique of statutory
interpretation. We are not yet seeing the development of a constitutional concept of procedural due process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although Australia does not have a constitutional provision guaranteeing procedural due process, both the legislature (at the Federal
level) and the courts are beginning to direct their attention towards
the issue, albeit in a limited fashion. The legislature has addressed
the issue through the enactment of a series of statutes designed to
improve the administrative process and its review. The courts have
shown some progress through the development of principles of procedural fairness. But there is some distance yet to travel.
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